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I. INTRODUCTION
Ever since the United States Congress enacted Internal Revenue
Code ("I.R.C") §107 ("Section 107")' to exempt ministers of the gospel
from paying federal income tax on either the income paid to them as
compensation for housing 2 or the rental value of a home provided to
them as compensation, 3 the clergy has enjoyed unquestioned exclusion

*Professor and Associate Dean for Academic Affairs, Thurgood Marshall School of Law, Texas
Southern University. LL.M Taxation, University of Florida; J.D., Texas Southern University;
B.B.A. Accounting, University of Houston, Central Campus; Certified Public Accountant (CPA).
Professor Aitsebaomo's recent publications include: The Individual Alternative Minimum Tax and
the Intersection of the Bush Tax Cuts: A Proposal For Permanent Repeal, 23 AKRON TAX JOURNAL
109 (2008); The Individual Alternative Minimum Tax: An Argument in Favor of Repeal, 74 UMKC
L. REV. 335 (2005); Ancillary Joint Ventures and the Unanswered Questions After Revenue Ruling
2004-51, 40 TEX. J. Bus. L. 429 (2005); The Nonprofit Hospital: A Callfor New National Guidance
Requiring Minimum Annual Charity Care to Qualify for Federal Tax Exemption, 26 CAMPBELL L.
REV. 75 (2004).
1. I.R.C. §107 (West 2013).
2. Id. at §107(2).
3. Id. at § 107(1).
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of the subsidy from gross income until the sex scandals that shook TV4
Ministries in the 1980s drew scrutiny to the little known tax provision.
In recent years, however, the necessity of the exemption has not only
been questioned,5 but some critics and interest groups have assailed the
provision altogether as violating the Establishment Clause 6 of the First
Amendment's prohibition against government support of religion.7 As if
4. See, e.g., In re: PTL Club, et al. v. United States (United States District Court for the
Central) (No. 88-236) District Court Reverses Injunction Against Service's Revocation Of Pt!
Club's Tax-Exempt Status, TAX NOTES TODAY, Apr. 1, 1988, available at LEXIS 88 TNT 84-50.
In May 1973, the Service issued a ruling to the PTL Club, which was operated by Jim
and Tammi Bakker, granting the organization tax exempt status under section 501(c)(3).
In June 1987, as a result of sex scandals that enveloped PTL leader, Jim Bakker, the PTL
Club, and its related Heritage Village Church and Missionary Fellowship, Inc., Fort
Heritage Campgrounds and Christian Retreat, and PTL Enterprise; all filed for
bankruptcy under Chapter 11. In late 1987, the IRS advised the bankruptcy trustee that it
intended to revoke the PTL Club's exempt status and that the revocation would be
retroactive to May 31, 1981.
Id. See also Treasury Advocates Few Changes For Exempt Television Ministries, TAX NOTES
TODAY, Oct. 7, 1987, available at LEXIS 87 TNT 195-H.
The House Ways and Means Oversight Subcommittee, continuing its series of hearings
into the universe of tax exempt organizations, took a look October 6 at the world of
television ministries. Unlike previous hearings, which focused on lobbying and political
activities of exempt organizations and unrelated business income tax, the televangelist
hearing appears to have been prompted by one event: the PTL scandal involving Jim and
Tammy Bakker. The PTL scandal, particularly allegations that the Bakkers had enriched
themselves with tax-exempt funds, provided the Administration with the material that it
needed to make some minor recommendations, while at the same time avoiding the
politically sensitive issues associated with religion. Assistant Treasury Secretary 0.
Donaldson Chapoton said that the Administration generally supports the current
statutory scheme governing television ministries; he did, however, suggest measures that
might better enforce the current prohibition of private inumment from tax-exempt funds.
Id.
5. "[I]t's fair to question why the clergy needs a tax-free allowance for more than one home,
and whether tax-exempt churches should subsidize millionaire ministers." Laura Saunders, Tax
Break For Clergy Questioned, WALL ST. J., Aug. 23, 2011,
available at
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB 10001424053111903635604576476340089320176.html.
6. The Establishment Clause is one of many clauses in the First Amendment to the United
States Constitution. The Establishment Clause states that "Congress shall make no law respecting
an establishment of religion." U.S. CONST. amend. 1.
7. Erwin Chemerinsky, The Parsonage Exemption Violates the Establishment Clause and
Should be Declared Unconstitutional, 24 WHITTIER L. REV. 707, 725-26 (2003) (arguing that the
only reason that Congress allowed the minister of the gospel a tax exemption "is to assist religion
and that violates the establishment clause"). See Professor Eric Rakowski, Are Federal Income Tax
Preferences for Ministers' Housing Constitutional?, TAX NOTES TODAY, Apr. 30, 2002, available
at LEXIS 2002 TNT 83-26 (arguing that "section 107 is unconstitutional because the benefit it
provides is limited to religious officials, rather than part of an exclusion available to a broader
group of taxpayers and justified by a permissible secular purpose"). See also Michael L. Gompertz,
Lawsuit Challenges Income Tax Preferences for Clergy, TAX NOTES, July 5, 2010, at 81-94
(arguing that sections 107 and 265(a)(6)(B) are unconstitutional because they are narrow tax
preferences that violate the establishment clause.). But see, Erika King, Tax Exemptions and the
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to exacerbate the furor, Congress subsequently enacted I.R.C. §265(a)(6)
("Section 265(a)(6)"), to allow ministers of the gospel to deduct from
their federal income tax return real property taxes and mortgage interest
paid on the home purchased with already tax-free money. 8 The problem
for the protesters 9 of these exemptions is that to obtain a judicial review
of the constitutionality of these tax provisions on the merits, 0they must
first scale the procedural hurdle of the Article III standing bar.'
In general, taxpayers do not have standing to challenge a federal or
state statute that allegedly violates the United States Constitution
because a taxpayer's stake in the moneys of the treasury is relatively
small and infinitesimal given that such stake is held in common with 12a
plethora of other taxpayers. 11 Nevertheless, Flast v. Cohen ("Flast"),
provides a limited exception 3 to the general prohibition against taxpayer
standing if the taxpayer satisfies a two-prong nexus test in alleging that a
certain government enactment violates the Establishment Clause of the
First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. "4
Pursuant to this two-prong nexus exception under Flast, 5 the
Federal District Court for the Eastern District of California ruled on May
21, 2010, in Freedom From Religion Foundation Inc. v. Timothy
Geithner ("FFRFv. Geithner"),16 that certain taxpayers had standing to
Establishment Clause, 49 SYRACUSE L. REV. 971, 973 (1999) (contending that "neither religious tax
exemptions nor taxation of religious entities violates the prohibition on entanglement of church and
state; but that, depending on the larger legislative scheme in question, and whether conventional
charitable institutions are similarly exempted, religious tax exemptions may violate the norm of
equal treatment also embodied in the clause"). See also Edward A. Zelinsky, Do Religious Tax
Exemptions Entangle in Violation of the Establishment Clause? The Constitutionality of the
Parsonage Allowance Exclusion, 33 CARDOzO L. REV. 1633, 1636 (2012) (section 107 and the
exclusion from gross income it grants to clerical recipients of housing and parsonage allowances are
constitutionally permitted, though not constitutionally required, responses to the problems of
entanglement inherent in the relationship between modem government and religion). See also
Martha M. Legg, Excluding Parsonages from Taxation: Declaring a Victor in the Duel Between
Caesar and the First Amendment, 10 GEO J.L. & PUB. POLICY 269 (2012) (concluding that the
parsonage exclusions do not violate the Establishment Clause).
8. I.R.C. §265(a)(6) (West 2013).
9. Principal among these protesters is the Freedom From Religion Foundation ("FFRF"), an
atheist organization which prides itself as an educational watchdog organization dedicated to
keeping church and state separate.
10. Under Article Ill, Section 2 of the United States Constitution, the judicial power of the
federal courts is limited to cases and controversies. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1.
11. Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 487 (1923).
12. Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968).
13. See Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589, 618 (1988) (noting that Flast provides a "narrow
exception" to the rule against standing).
14. Flast, 392 U.S. at 102-03.
15. Id.
16. Freedom From Religion Found., Inc. v. Geithner, 715 F. Supp. 2d 1051 (E.D. Cal. 2010).
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challenge the constitutionality of Section 107.17 Although the ruling was
heralded at the time by some as possibly paving a way for the potential
demise of the procedural roadblock against taxpayer standing to
1
challenge alleged government support of religion through the tax code, 8
the ruling was stymied on April 4, 2011, with the release of the Supreme
Court's opinion in Arizona v. Winn ("Arizona").' 9 In Arizona, the
United States Supreme Court ruled that taxpayers lacked standing to
challenge the constitutionality of an Arizona law that provided state tax
credits to taxpayers in exchange for contributions they made to certain
School Tuition Organizations ("STOs"), which subsequently used the
contributions to pay for scholarships to students attending private
religious schools. 20 Furthermore, the Supreme Court stated under the
general prohibition against taxpayer standing that when "a government
expends resources or declines to impose a tax, its budget does not
necessarily suffer" to visit the requisite harm or injury necessary to
confer taxpayer standing. 2'
Rather than apply the two-prong nexus exception as provided in
Flast2 2 to find taxpayer standing, the Supreme Court, instead, factually
distinguished Flast by holding that because the alleged religious funding
of sectarian education challenged in Arizona was effected indirectly
through the issuance of tax credits, as opposed to a direct government
extraction and spending of public funds in support of religious
instruction in sectarian schools (as was the case in Flast), the indirect tax
credit financing device does not give rise to government spending under
Flastto bestow Article III standing upon taxpayers.2 3
To buttress its distinction that there was no government spending
involved in the tax credit funding mechanism to invoke Article III
standing, the Supreme Court proclaimed that "[w]hen Arizona taxpayers
choose to contribute to STOs, they spend 'their own money,' 24 not
17.

1.R.C. §107 (West 2013).

18. SAMUEL A. DONALDSON, IS THIS THE END OF DAYS FOR THE PARSONAGE ALLOWANCE?,
IMPORTANT DEVELOPMENTS IN FEDERAL INCOME ESTATE & GIFT TAXATION AFFECTING

INDIVIDUALS 8(Aug. 2009-Sept. 2010); see also William Shubb, Court Allows Constitutional
Challenge to Ministerial Housing Allowance Exclusion, TAX NOTES TODAY, May 25, 2010,
availableat LEXIS 2010 TNT 100-10.

19. Arizona Christian Sch. Tuition Org. v. Winn, 131 S. Ct. 1436 (2011).
20. Id. at 1437.
21. Id. at 1443.
22. Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 102-03 (1968) (discussing the two prong nexus exception).
23. Arizona, 131 S. Ct. at 1438-39.
24. Id. at 1447 (internal quotations added). Ironically, some of the STOs' advertisement
suggests that contributors do not actually spend their own money. For instance, The Arizona
Episcopal School Foundation, has on its website Q&A section the following: "What does this
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money the state has collected from respondents or from other
taxpayers ....
25 Like contributions that lead to charitable tax
deductions, contributions yielding STO tax credits are 'not owed to the
State' 26 and, in fact, pass directly from taxpayers to private
organizations. '27
Against this background, the Supreme Court
concluded that "what matters under Flast is whether sectarian STOs
receive government funds drawn from general tax revenues, so that
moneys have been extracted from a citizen and ' handed
to a religious
28
institution in violation of the citizen's conscience."
Such a superficial distinction between a tax credits device of
funding sectarian education and a direct expenditure method (which
formed the nucleus of the ruling) is flawed, without a material
difference, not principled, or even entirely correct, because the
dispositive inquiry for standing purposes is premised entirely on the
form in which the contribution was made rather than the substance of the
contribution taken as a whole. Likewise, the ruling exemplifies the
Court's misconception of the tax implications of tax credits vis-a-vis tax
deductions. Given the culminating dismissal of FFRFv. Geithner29 due
[contribution] cost me? Nothing. Your contribution is subtracted in full from total state taxes owed
for the year when you file your 2010 return." Frequently Asked Questions, ARIZONA EPISCOPAL
SCH. FOUND., http://www.az-esf.org/faq.php (last visited Mar. 6, 2013). See also The Arizona STO,
JTO advertisement with the following:
Show your support through the Arizona Private School Tax Credit Program. Every
Arizona tax payer that supports the JTO will receive a dollar-for-dollar Arizona tax
credit up to a maximum of $500 for filing single or married (filing separate returns) and
$1,000 for married (filing joint returns). A tax credit is more beneficial than a tax
deduction; it is a dollar-for-dollar credit to your Arizona tax liability. In other words,
you can pay your taxes to the State ofArizona or to the JTO. Encourage your family and
friends to support this worthy cause as well. Even your company can get involved with
matching donations. It will not cost anyone a dime! It WILL benefit the children and
families in our community. You do not need to have school-aged children to
participate. We encourage you to contact the JTO or your tax professional for further
information about getting involved in this program."
JEWISH TUITION ORG., https://www.jtophoenix.org/ (last visited Mar. 6, 2013) (emphasis added).
25. Arizona, 131 S. Ct. at 1447.
26. Id. at 1448 (internal quotations added). But, according to the Arizona Republic, from
1998 to 2008, the Arizona STOs tax credit program cost Arizonians about $380 million in forgone

revenue. That is about $38 million in forgone revenue per year. Projected to 2012, that would be
about $532 million (i.e., $38 million per year x fourteen years, since 1998) in forgone revenue. Pat
Kossan & Ronald J. Jansen, Bill is signed by Gov. Brewer, THE ARIZONA REPUBLIC (May 11, 2010
12:00AM),
http://www.azcentral.com/arizonarepublic/local/articles/2010/05/11/2010051I tuitiontax-credit-bill.html. See also Arizona, 131 S. Ct. at 1444 (stating "[riespondents may be right that
Arizona's STO tax credits have an estimated annual value of over $50 million").
27. Arizona, 131 S. Ct. at 1448.
28. Id. at 1448.
29. See FFRF v. Geithner, 715 F. Supp. 2d 1051 (E.D. Cal. 2010).
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to the Supreme Court's disinclination in Arizona 30 to apply the
principles of Flast outside of its narrow factual settings, coupled with the
Court's declaration that when "a government expends resources or
declines to impose a tax, its budget does not necessarily suffer"'" to
confer Article III standing upon taxpayer, there is no gainsaying the fact
that the Supreme Court's ruling in Arizona 32 essentially hands
governments the ammunition to circumvent the Establishment Clause
restraint on government support of religion by denying taxpayer
standing under Flast33 whenever the government affirmatively funds
religion, albeit indirectly, through the use of tax credits or "declines to
impose a tax" 34 by granting an exclusive federal income tax exemption
to the minister of the clergy. 35 Besides, the comments made in the
separate concurring opinion written by Justices Scalia and Thomas-that
"Flast is an anomaly in our jurisprudence, irreconcilable with Article III
restrictions on federal judicial power. .. ,,36warrants the question of
whether the Supreme Court is resolved to standing in the way of
taxpayer standing to seek meritorious redress under Flast to challenge
alleged government support of religion through devices under the tax
laws.
To answer these questions, Part II of the article begins with a
critical examination of the parsonage exemption Act as was originally
conceived at inception, the expansion and modification of the Act over
the years, and the current statutory framework of the exemption under
the Internal Revenue Code ("Code"). Part III evaluates who is
considered a minister of the gospel within the meaning of the Code, and
whether a minister of the gospel may obtain a parsonage exemption for
more than one home at a time. Part IV discusses the various attempts to
rid the Code of the parsonage exemption. In this part, the article37
analyzes the Federal District Court's ruling in FFRF v. Geithner
allowing taxpayers standing to challenge the constitutionality of the
parsonage exemption and the subsequent U.S. Supreme Court decision
in Arizona 38 that led to the voluntary dismissal by stipulation of FFRFv.
Geithner. Part V scrutinizes the underpinnings of the U.S. Supreme
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.

See Arizona, 131 S. Ct. at 1436.
Id. at 143.
See id.
See Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968).
Arizona, 131 S. Ct. at 1443.
I.R.C. §107 (West 2013).
Arizona, 131 S. Ct. at 1450 (Scalia, J., concurring).
See FFRF v. Geithner, 715 F. Supp. 2d 1051 (E.D. Cal. 2010).
Arizona, 131 S. Ct. 1436.
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Court's ruling in Arizona and queries, among others, whether Arizonians
really "spend their own money" when they contribute to STOs and
receive state tax credits in exchange for their contributions. 39 The article
contends that the premise of the ruling is superficial, flawed, incorrect,
not logical or principled, and the author sides with the dissent that
taxpayers should have been accorded standing under Flast to pursue
their claims on the merits. Part VI examines the recurring question of
whether the parsonage exemption violates the Establishment Clause of
the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution under the Lemon
enunciation, and argues that it does. Part VII concludes that the U.S.
Supreme Court is resolved to standing in the way of taxpayer standing to
seek meritorious redress of alleged government support of religion
through tax devices by holding that (1) when "a government expends
resources or declines to impose a tax, its budget does not necessarily
suffer" 40 to confer Article III standing upon taxpayer, and (2) that
because "respondents challenge a tax credit as opposed to government
expenditure, they lack Article III standing under Flast v. Cohen.'
II. EXCLUSION FROM GROSS INCOME OF THE VALUE OF A HOME
FURNISHED TO A MINISTER OF THE GOSPEL

A.

Inception and Expansion of the Scope of the ParsonageExemption

The exclusion of the rental value of a home provided to a minister
of the gospel from gross income (the parsonage exemption) 42 dates back
to the Revenue Act of 1921 (the "Act").43 Under § 213(b)(11) of the
Act, Congress provided that gross income does not include the "rental
value of a dwelling house and appurtenances thereof furnished to a
minister of the gospel as part of his compensation., 44 The exact text of
the exclusion was readopted by Congress and included in the Revenue
Acts of 192845 and 1932,46 as well as the Internal Revenue Code of
1939. 47 Prior to the parsonage exemption revisions in the Internal
Revenue Code of 1954,48 only ministers who were provided in-kind
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.

Id. at 1447.
Id. at 1443.
Id. at 1437
1.R.C. §107 (West 2013).
Pub. L. No. 67-98, 42 Stat. 239, 67th Congress, Sess. 1. CH. 136 (1921).
Id.
Revenue Act of 1928, ch. 853, sec. 22(b)(8), 45 Stat. 798 (1928).
Revenue Act of 1932, ch. 209, sec. 22(b)(6), 47 Stat. 179 (1932).

47.

I.R.C. §22(b)(6), ch 2, 53 Stat. 10 (1939).

48.

I.R.C. ch. 736, 68A Stat. 32 (1954).
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housing were allowed to exclude the value of the parsonage provided to
them as compensation from gross income. 49 Consequently, ministers
who were not provided a home but instead received additional money to
compensate them for the expense of renting their own homes were
somewhat penalized because they were required to include in gross
income and pay federal income tax on the supplemental pay they
received in lieu of not being furnished a home.50 To remedy this
apparent disparate treatment, Congress amended the Code in 1954 to
"remove the discrimination in existing law by providing that the present
exclusion is to apply to rental allowances paid to ministers to the extent
used by them to rent or provide a home. 51
Apart from expanding the scope of the parsonage exemption,
Congress also replaced the phrase "a dwelling house and appurtenances
thereof' in the existing provision with the term "a home., 52 By
substituting the word "home" for the phrase, "a dwelling house and
appurtenances thereof' Congress made clear that it did it not intend for
53
the revision of the provision to alter the principal meaning of the Act.
With these changes, the text of the 1954 Code, as revised, read: "[i]n the
case of a minister of the gospel, gross income does not include-(1) the
rental value of a home furnished to him as part of his compensation; or
(2) the rental allowance paid to him as part of his compensation, to the
extent used by him to rent or provide a home." 54
Based on the revised language of the provision, the U.S. Tax Court
55
ruled in favor of the taxpayer in Warren v. Commissioner ("Warren"),
by holding that section 107 rental exclusion is limited to the amount
used to provide a home and not the lesser of the amount used to provide
a home or the fair market rental value of the home as contended by the
Service. 6 Upon appeal by the Service, the Ninth Circuit, on its own
49. I.R.C. § 22(b)(6), ch. 2, 53 Stat. 10 (1939).
50. General Revenue Revision: Hearings Before the H. Comm. on Ways & Means, 83rd
Cong. I(Statement of Hon. Peter F. Mark, Jr., on H.R. 4275, Concerning the Taxability of a Cash
Allowance Paid to Clergymen in Lieu of Furnishing Them a Dwelling on Forty Topics Pertaining to
the General Revision of the Internal Revenue Code).
51. S. REP. NO. 1622, 83rd Cong. 2d Sess. 186 (1954); see also H.R. REP. NO. 1337, 83rd
Cong., 2nd Sess., A35 (1954).
52. I.R.C. §107(1), ch. 736, 68A Stat. 32 (1954).
53. H.R. REP. 1337, 83rd Cong., 2d Sess. A35 (1954); S. Rept. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess.
186 (1954) (stating that the word "home" as used in both paragraphs is not intended to change the
law under section 22(b)(6) of the Code of 1939 which used the term "dwelling house and
appurtenances thereof").
54. Id. SeealsoI.R.C. §107.
55. Warren v. Comm'r, 114 T.C. 343 (2000).
56. Id. at 344.
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motion, raised the issue of the constitutionality of section 107 altogether
in reviewing the appeal.57 Concerned over a potential declaration by the
Ninth Circuit that section 107 was unconstitutional all in all if the Ninth
exemption on the
Circuit Court of Appeals reviewed the parsonage
58
merits, the clergy lobbied Congress to intervene.
In response, Congress passed the Clergy Housing Clarification Act
of 200259 to explain that the exclusion allowed under I.R.C. §107 may
not exceed the fair rental value of the home, including furnishings,
appurtenances, and costs of utilities. 60 The intent of this legislation was
to render moot the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals' consideration of the
Warren appeal, including the Court's intended review of the
constitutionality of the parsonage exemption (I.R.C. §107).61 This
57. Warren v. Comm'r, 302 F.3d 1012, 1014 (9th Cir. 2002). ("After oral argument, we
appointed Prof. Chemerinsky as amicus. We requested supplemental briefing from the parties and
amici on whether we should consider the constitutionality of § 107(2) and, if so, whether Rev.
Warren's claimed exclusion violates the Establishment Clause because it provides a tax benefit
available only to 'ministers of the gospel."').
58. See 148 CONG. REC. H1299 (daily ed. Apr. 16, 2002) (statement of Rep. Pomeroy).
Mr. Speaker, in one of the most obvious cases of judicial overreach in recent memory,
the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in San Francisco is poised to inflict a devastating tax
increase on America's clergy. Unless Congress acts quickly, the 81-year-old housing tax
exclusion for members of the clergy will be struck down by judicial overreach on the
part of America's most reversed and most activist circuit court ....
I had a very
interesting roundtable meeting in North Dakota yesterday with a number of clergy
terribly concerned about the underlying threat to the housing allowance. North Dakota
has more churches per capita than any other State in the country, more than 2,000
churches, 78 percent of which are located in communities of under 2,500 people. These
are congregations just struggling to get by. We have already lost 400 churches over the
last several years, and projections are we could lose another fifty in this decade. I had
one of the roundtable participants talk about how, when their daughter was born, the
trustee who happened to be the city accountant said they should go down and apply for
food stamps, because they were now eligible, but that was all that could be paid. One
other minister talked about when the pledges did not come in on schedule, they were
simply not given their full dimension of meager salary. And to think about laying upon
these congregations and these faithful servants of those congregations, the pastors, this
new tax bill is really completely unacceptable. One of the pastors participating gave me
the tax return that he was about to put in the mail yesterday. It reflects the combined
income of him and his wife, both pastors serving a church in Fargo, North Dakota.
Although making a very modest income, the tax hit, if they lost the housing exclusion,
would be an additional $3,958.
Id.
59. Description Of H.R. 4156, the "Clergy Housing Clarification Act Of2002, " As Passed
By The House Of Representatives On April 16, 2002, JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, Apr. 18, 2002
availableat 2002 WL 34255180.
60. Id.
61. Warren, 302 F.3d at 1014. "On May 20, 2002, the President signed into law the Clergy
Housing Allowance Clarification Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-181, 116 Stat. 583, which resolved
the question of statutory interpretation raised by the parties. Its sponsors explained that this bill was
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legislative change essentially ushered in the language of the current
statutory framework of Section 107.
B.

The CurrentStatutory Frame Work of the ParsonageExemption

Today's statutory framework of the parsonage exemption is
governed by section §107.62 The provision states in relevant parts that
"[i]n the case of a minister of the gospel, gross income does not
include--(1) the rental value of a home furnished to him as part of his
compensation; or (2) the rental allowance paid to him as part of his
compensation, to the extent used by him to rent or provide a home and to
the extent such allowance does not exceed the fair rental value of the
home, including furnishings and appurtenances such as a garage, plus
the cost of utilities. 6 3
Treasury Regulations clarify that the word "home" as used within
the meaning of the Code means "a dwelling place (including
' 64
furnishings) and the appurtenances thereto, such as a garage."
Likewise, the Regulations explain that the "term 'rental allowance'
means an amount paid to a minister to rent or otherwise provide a home
if such amount is designated as rental allowance pursuant to official
action taken.., by the employing church or other qualified
organization.' ' 65 In order for the home or rental allowance to be exempt
from income, however, it must be provided to the minister as
compensation in consideration for his services as a minister of the gospel
and the amount must be formally designated as such by the organization
paying the allowance, either in its minutes,
contract, resolution, or other
66
official document, prior to payment.
III. WHO

A.

IS CONSIDERED A MINISTER OF THE GOSPEL?

Overview

In general, a minister of the gospel is any individual who has been
67
"duly ordained, commissioned, or licensed [as a] minister of a church,"
and such individual must be engaged in services of the kind typically

designed to prevent this Court from reaching the constitutionality of § 107(2)." Id.
62.

I.R.C. §107 (West 2013).

63.
64.
65.
66.

Id.
Treas. Reg. §1.107-1(b) (1963).
Id.
Id. at § 1.107-1(a)-(b).

67.

Rev. Rul. 59-270, 1959-2 C.B. 44. See also Treas. Reg. § 1.107-1(a).
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performed by a minister of the gospel.68 Services typically performed
by a minister of the gospel that fall within the purview of the Code's
definition include "the performance of sacerdotal functions, the conduct
of religious worship, the administration and maintenance of religious
organizations and their integral agencies, and the performance of
teaching and administrative duties at theological seminaries. 69
Notwithstanding the Service's apparent narrow restriction of the
exemption to ordained or commissioned ministers, the Tax Court has
extended the exclusion to include an unordained, duly commissioned
Minister of the synagogue vested with complete authority to exercise his
ministry in the conduct of religious worship, education, and the
performance of sacerdotal rites or tenets of Judaism. 70 Accordingly, the
ultimate determination of whether or not a preacher is considered a
minister of the gospel within the meaning of the Code and thus entitled
to the parsonage exemption is based on the facts and circumstances of
each particular case.
B.

Is a Minister of the Gospel Entitled to ParsonageAllowance
Exemption for More than One Home at a Time?

As stated above, section 10771 excludes from the gross income of a
minister of the gospel the rental value of "a home" provided to him, as
part of his compensation, or the rental allowance paid to him to the
extent used by him to rent or provide "a home. 72 Treasury Regulations
§ 1.107-1(b) explains that the term "home" as used in the Code means "a
dwelling place (including furnishings) and the appurtenances thereto,
such as a garage. 73 Furthermore, "rental allowance" means "an amount
",74
paid to a minister to rent or otherwise provide a home ....
Because Congress did not explicitly limit the exclusion of section

68.
69.

Rev. Rul. 59-270.
Id. (noting that "[t]he rules provided by section 1.1402 (c)-I (e) of the Regulations are for

determining whether services performed by a minister are in the exercise of his ministry in the case
of any individual who is a duly ordained, commissioned, or licensed minister of a church. . . ' and
who elects to have the Federal old age and survivors insurance system established by the Social
Security Act extended to service performed by him in his capacity as such a minister. Therefore,
such regulations indicate that the scope of the phrase 'minister of the gospel' as used in section 107
of the Code is commensurate with such phrase as interpreted in I.T. 1306, supra, under the Revenue
Act of 1921 and I.T. 3658, supra, under the 1939 Code").
70. Silverman v. CIR, 57 T.C. 727, 731 (1972).
71.
I.R.C. §107.
72. Id.; Treas. Reg. §1.107-1.
73. Id. at §1.107-1(b).
74. Id.
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107 to only one home in the textual language that the exclusion applies
to the rental value of "a home," an issue arose in 2010 in Driscoll v.
Commissioner ("Driscoll")75 regarding whether a minister may properly
exclude from gross income the parsonage allowance paid to him to
maintain two homes for himself in one taxable year.76 The minister in
question, Philip A. Driscoll ("Minister Driscoll"), was an ordained
minister for the Mighty Horn Ministries, Inc. (the "Church"). 77 During
the years at issue, Minister Driscoll and his wife owned a principal
residence or home in Cleveland, Tennessee (the "Cleveland Home"),
and a lake second home (the "Lake Home") in Lake Ocoee near
Cleveland, Tennessee.78 From 1996 to 1999, the Church paid Minister
Driscoll parsonage allowances to maintain both the Cleveland Home and
the Lake Home.79 Minister Driscoll excluded all of the payments from
his gross income, contending that the payments were all excludible from
his gross income under I.R.C. §107.80 The I.R.S., however, disagreed,
contending that the parsonage allowance was only applicable to Minister
Driscoll's principal residence, the Cleveland Home, 81
and thus
inapplicable to his second vacation residence, the Lake Home.
Relying on I.R.C. §7701(p)(1) definitions,8 2 the Tax Court sided
with Minister Driscoll,83 and ruled against the I.R.S., pointing out that in
interpreting the meaning of the term "a home" as used in the Code, the

75. Driscoll v. Comm'r, 135 T.C. 557 (2010), rev'd and remanded, 669 F.3d 1309 (11 th Cir.
2012), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct 358 (2012).
76. Id. at 560.
77. Id. at 558.
78. Id. at 558-59.
79. Id. at 559.
80. Id. at 559-60.
81. Id.at559.
82. I.R.C. §7 701(p) (West 2013)
p) Cross references.(1) Other definitions.(1) Singular as including plural, section 1 [1 USCS § 1]
(2) Plural as including singular, section 1 [I USCS § 1].
Id
83. Driscoll, 135 T.C. at 566
We hold that the portion of the Ministries parsonage allowance that the Ministries paid
to Mr. Driscoll as part of his compensation during each of the years at issue and that he
used during each of those years to provide for himself a lake second home satisfies the
requirements in section 107(2) that an allowance be paid to him as part of his
compensation and be used to provide a home. Accordingly, we hold that petitioners are
entitled for each of the taxable years at issue to exclude from gross income under section
107 the Ministries parsonage allowance with respect to their lake second home.
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84
singular includes the plural unless the statute indicates otherwise.
Upon appeal of the Tax Court's ruling by the I.R.S. to the United States
Court of Appeals, 85 the Eleventh Circuit, in a de novo review of the U.S.
Tax Court's ruling, reversed the Tax Court on February 8, 2012 and
remanded the case, holding that the word "home" as used in the
legislative history of the provision had a "decidedly singular
connotation. ,,86
With respect to the Tax Court's reliance on I.R.C. §7701(p)(1)
definitions that singular terms in the Code included their plural forms,
the Eleventh Circuit ruled that such cross references "are made only for
convenience" and do not apply especially if "the context [of the
legislative use of the word] indicates otherwise., 87 Accordingly, the
parsonage exemption, as interpreted by the Eleventh Circuit Court of
Appeals on February 8, 2012 applies to only one home at a time during
the tax year.88

IV. ATTEMPTS TO ELIMINATE THE PARSONAGE EXEMPTION FROM THE
CODE

A.

In General

Ironically, one of the preliminary attempts to rid the Code of the
parsonage exemption emanated from the executive branch. In his state
of the Union address, President Ronald Reagan 89 asked Secretary of the
Treasury, Donald Regan, 90 for a plan of action to simplify and make the
tax code fairer to everyone. 91 In response, Treasury Secretary Regan
84.
litigation.
85.
86.
habitually

I.R.C. §7701(p)(1), successor to I.R.C. §7701(m)(1), the hitherto provision during the
Comm'r v. Driscoll, 669 F.3d 1309 (11 th Cir. 2012), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 358 (2012).
Id. at 1311-12. "'Home' is defined as 'the house and grounds with their appurtenances
occupied by a family: one's principal place of residence: DOMICILE."' (citing

WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1082 (1993)). "Based upon this definition,

we conclude that 'home' has decidedly singular connotations." Id. at 1311-12.
87. Driscoll, 669 F.3d at 1311. (The Eleventh Circuit explained "the Dictionary Act's
singular-to-plural provision should only apply if the context of I.R.C. § 107(2) reasonably supports
such an application. We hold that it does not.").
88. Id. at 1312 ("As the Commissioner argues, the consistent use of the singular in this
legislative history-'a dwelling house,' 'a home,' and 'the home'--demonstrate that Congress
intended for the parsonage allowance exclusion to apply to only one home.").
89. The 40th President of the United States serving from 1981-1989.
90. The 66th United States Secretary of the Treasury serving from 1981-1985.
91. U.S. DEP'T OF TREASURY, TAX REFORM FOR FAIRNESS, SIMPLICITY, AND ECONOMIC
GROWTH: THE DEP'T REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT, vol. 1, iii, (1984), available at
http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/tax-policy/Documents/tres84vISum.pdf. In the report the
your state of the Union
Secretary of the Treasury Donald Regan wrote to the President saying: "[i]n
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proposed, among others, the repeal of the exclusion of the housing
allowances for ministers. In the proposal, the Treasury Secretary
reasoned that the existing exclusion from federal income tax of the
parsonage allowance "departs from generally applicable income
measurement principles, with the result that ministers pay less tax than
other taxpayers with the same or even smaller economic incomes. '9 2
Due, however, to the overwhelming negative reaction from the
clergy in opposition 93 to the proposed elimination of the subsidy, the
President relented and the parsonage exemption was retained in the
Code. 9 4 Apart from the failed attempt by the executive branch to
eliminate the parsonage exemption, other groups and taxpayers have
tried, but the most recent are the judicial challenges brought by the
Freedom From Religion Foundation Incorporation.
B.

Freedom From Religion Foundation Inc. v. Timothy Geithner
1. Summary Facts of the Case.

The Freedom From Religion Foundation Incorporation ("FFRF") is
a nonprofit free-thought9 5 organization based in Wisconsin 96 and part of
its mission is dedicated to promoting, among others, the principle of
address, you said: 'To talk of meeting present situation by increasing taxes is a Band-Aid solution
which does nothing to cure an illness that been coming on for half a century, to say nothing of the
fact that it poses a real threat to economic recovery ....
I am asking secretary Don Regan for a
plan for action to simplify the entire tax code so all taxpayers, big and small, are treated more
fairly.. . I have asked that specific recommendations, consistent with those objectives, be
presented to me by December 1984."' Id.
92. See U.S. DEP'T OF TREASURY,TAX REFORM FOR FAIRNESS, SIMPLICITY, AND ECONOMIC
GROWTH: THE DEPARTMENT REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT, vol. 11, 49 (1984).

In the proposal the

Treasury Secretary argued that "Itihere is no evidence that the financial circumstances of ministers
justify special tax treatment. The average minister's compensation is low compared to other
professionals, but not compared to taxpayers in general. Moreover, the tax benefit of the exclusion
provides a disproportionately greater benefit to relatively affluent ministers, due to the higher
marginal tax rates applicable to their incomes." Id.
93. Clergy Unhappy With Proposed Elimination of Parsonage Allowance, TAX NOTES
TODAY, Jan. 2, 1985, available at LEXIS 26 Tax Notes 13. ("Treasury has received 20 letters from
clergy who oppose the elimination of the parsonage allowance as provided for in the department's
tax reform proposal.") Id.
94. Rental Value of Parsonage: Clergy Got Relief From Original Treasury Proposal, TAX
NOTES TODAY, July 30, 1985, available at LEXIS 28 Tax Notes 623 ("Treasury has noted that the
President's tax reform plan does not contain Treasury's November 1984 proposal for repealing the
exemption for ministers' housing allowances.").
95. The national office of Freedom From Religion Foundation is housed in Freethought Hall,
located in Madison Wisconsin. About Freethought Hall, FREEDOM FROM RELIGION FOUND.,
http://ffrf.org/about/about-freethought-hall (last visited Mar. 10, 2013).
96. Id.
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separation of church and state. 97 Members of its California branch
instituted this suit against Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner, 98 I.R.S
Commissioner Douglas Schulman, 99 et al, "seeking a declaration that
I.R.C. §§107 and 265(a)(6) violate the Establishment Clause of the
United States Constitution" 00 by providing support for religion.
2. Text of the Statutes Challenged by FreedomFrom Religion

Foundation,Inc.
i. Rental value of parsonages - I.R.C. § 107
I.R.C. §107 provides in relevant parts that:
In the case of a minister of the gospel, gross income does not
include(]) the rental value of a home furnished to him as part of his
compensation; or
(2) the rental allowance paid to him as part of his compensation, to the
extent used by him to rent or provide a home and to the extent such
allowance does not exceed the fair rental value of the home, including
furnishings and appurtenances such as a garage, plus the cost of
utilities. 1o1
ii. Expenses and interest relating to tax-exempt income
§265(a)(6)

I.R.C.

Section [265(a)] not to apply with respect to parsonage and military
housing allowances. No deduction shall be denied under this section for
interest on a mortgage on, or real property taxes on, the home of the
taxpayer by reason of the receipt of an amount as(A) a military housing allowance, or
(B) a parsonage allowance excludable from gross income under [I.R.C.

97.
98.
DEP'T

See FFRF v. Geithner, 715 F. Supp. 2d 1051, 1055 (E.D. Cal. 2010).
Is the 75th United States Secretary of the Treasury. Secretaries of the Treasury, U.S.
OF

THE

TREASURY,

http://www.treasury.gov/about/history/Pages/edu-history-secretary-index.aspx
(last visited Mar.
10, 2013).
99. Is the 47th and current Commissioner of Internal Revenue. Comm 'r of Internal Revenue
Douglas H. Shulman, I.R.S., http://www.irs.gov/uac/Commissioner-of-Internal-Revenue-DouglasH.-Shulman (last visited Mar. 10, 2013).
100. FFRF, 715F. Supp. 2dat 1055-56.
101. I.R.C. §107 (West 2013).
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Sec. 107].102

In response, the Government moved to dismiss the suit, contending,
among others, that plaintiff lacked standing to bring the claim in federal
court. 103

3. Do Taxpayers Have Standing to Sue for the Relief Sought?
In general, the power of the federal courts is constrained by Article
III, Section 1 of the U.S. Constitution to only cases and controversies in
which the plaintiff has standing. 0 4 To obtain standing, Article III
mandates that the plaintiff allege "a personal injury fairly traceable to
the defendant's alleged unlawful conduct and likely to be redressed by
the requested relief." 10 5 Against this background, the Supreme Court
enunciated that plaintiffs generally do not possess standing to commence
a federal suit where they allege an injury based exclusively on their
status as taxpayer because a taxpayer's stake in the moneys of the U.S.
treasury is relatively small and infinitesimal
since such stake is held in
06
common with several other taxpayers. 1
Notwithstanding this general prohibition against federal taxpayer
standing, the U.S. Supreme Court created an exception under Flast v.
Cohen by holding that taxpayers had standing to challenge a statute
which provided funds for educational and instructional materials to
religious schools on the basis that such practice was in violation of the
07
establishment clause.
Although Flast involved the expenditure of federal funds
appropriated by Congress under the Elementary and Secondary
Education Act of 1965 to finance instruction in religious schools' 0 8 (as
opposed to a statute exempting income of ministers from taxation), the
Federal District Court, citing the U.S. Supreme Court, stated that it will
not allow such "artificial distinctions"'0 9 between direct grants to
religious organizations and tax programs that provide like benefits to
religious organizations deter it from finding that taxpayers in the instant
case had standing under Flast to challenge the constitutionality of

102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.

Id. at §265(a)(6).
FFRF,715 F. Supp. 2d at 1056-57.
Id. at 1059 (quoting Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751 (1984)).
Id. See also Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 487 (1923)
Allen, 468 U.S. at 751.
FFRF,715 F. Supp. 2d at 1059. See Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 87-88 (1968).
Flast,392 U.S. at 85-86.
FFRF,715 F.Supp. 2d at 1060.
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sections § 107 and 265(a)(6). " 0

In reaching its decisions, the Federal District Court stated that
analogous to the basis of finding injury in Flast,the U.S. Supreme Court
has also found that "[e]very tax exemption constitutes a subsidy that
affects nonqualifying taxpayers, forcing them to become indirect
vicarious 'donors."" 11
Accordingly, the Federal District Court
concluded that "[a] tax exemption has much the same effect as a cash
grant to the organization of the amount of tax it would have to pay on its
income."' 12 Consequently, the Federal District Court held on May 21,
2010, that the plaintiffs have established, under Flast, that they have
standing as federal taxpayers to challenge I.R.C. §§ 107 and 265(a)(6). "3
Following this verdict, the United States Supreme Court was
considering a taxpayer standing issue in a case involving Arizona v.
Winn ("Arizona"). 114 Consequently, the shelf life of the Federal District
Court's ruling that taxpayer had standing to challenge the federal statute
would rest upon the outcome of the Arizona case discussed below.
C. Arizona Christian School Tuition Organizations v. Kathleen Winn
1. Summary Facts of the Case
In 1997, the Arizona legislature enacted section 43-1089 of the
Arizona code which grants individual taxpayers a dollar-for-dollar tax
credit in exchange for contributions they make to School Tuition
Organizations ("STOs"). "5 An STO is a private nonprofit organization
established under the laws of the State of Arizona. Under Arizona state
law, an STO is required to distribute a minimum of ninety percent of the
revenue it receives in the form of scholarships or tuition grants to
students who are enrolled in Arizona nongovernment primary or
secondary schools. 116 Even though the State of Arizona does not

110.

Id. at 1060-61.

111.
112.

Id.; see also Texas Monthly Inc. v. Bullock, 489 U.S. 1, 14 (1989).
FFRF, 715 F. Supp. 2d at 1060 (quoting Regan v. Taxation with Representation of

Wash., 461 U.S. 540, 544 (1983)).
113. Id. at 1061 ("Plaintiffs have therefore established that they have standing as federal
taxpayers to challenge §§ 107 and 265(a)(6) of the Internal Revenue Code for allegedly violating
the Establishment Clause.").
114. See Arizona Christian Sch. Tuition Org. v. Winn, 131 S. Ct. 1436 (2011).
115. Id. at 1040. See ARIZONA REV. STAT. ANN. §43-1089 (West 2013). See also Winn v.
Ariz. Christian Sch. Tuition Org., 562 F.3d 1002, 1005 (9th Cir. 2009), cert. granted, cause
remanded sub nom. Arizona Sch. Choice Trust v. Winn, 131 S. Ct. 2091 (U.S. 2011) and rev'd, 131
S. Ct. 1436 (U.S. 2011) and rev'd and remanded, 658 F.3d 889 (9th Cir. 2011).
116.

Arizona, 131 S. Ct. at 1440-41.
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generally set the scholarship award guidelines for STOs, the state
prohibits STOs from discriminating in their
award of scholarships on the
7
basis of race, color, or national origin. 11
Other than the racial discrimination prohibition, there is nothing in
the Arizona statute that forbids an STO from awarding scholarships
preferentially to schools that provide religious instructions or admit
students based on a preferred religious affiliation." 8 Consequently,
scholarships could, and were awarded, indiscriminately to sectarian
schools. "9 To induce contributions, taxpayers who contribute money to
STOs are allowed under the statute to receive a state tax credit
of up to
2
$500 20 when they file their Arizona state income tax return. 1 '
2. Contention of Plaintiff-Taxpayers
Plaintiff-Taxpayers contended that because the largest STOs
restricted their scholarship awards to religious private schools, students
desiring to attend nonreligious private schools were effectively
disadvantaged due to the fact that only a disproportionately smaller
117. Id. See also section (G)(2) of the ARIZONA REV. STAT. ANN. §43-1089.
118. See Arizona, 562 F. 3d at 1006 (noting that "[i]n practice, plaintiffs allege, many STOs
have opted to limit the schools to which they offer scholarships, and a number of STOs provide
scholarships that may be used only at religious schools or schools of a particular denomination. For
example, plaintiffs allege that Arizona's three largest STOs, as measured by the amount of
contributions reported in 1998, each restricts its scholarships to use at religious schools. The largest
of these, the Catholic Tuition Organization of the Diocese of Phoenix, restricts its scholarships to
use at Catholic schools in the Phoenix Diocese such as St. Mary's, which advertises its mission as
being 'to provide a quality Catholic education by developing and sustaining a rich tradition
grounded in Gospel and family values.' The second largest STO, the Arizona Christian School
Tuition Organization, expressly restricts scholarships to use at 'evangelical' Christian Schools. The
third largest, Brophy Community Foundation, restricts its scholarships to use at two Catholic
schools, one of which advertises its goal to be 'instill[ing] a knowledge of the truths of faith,
enlightened by the post-Conciliar teachings of the Church,' and the other of which promotes itself
as offering students 'an intimate relationship with God' through 'the process of nurturing the
soul').
119. Id. See also Winn v. Killian, 307 F. 3d 1011, 1014 (9th Cir. 2002)
At least 94% of that amount was donated to STOs that restrict their scholarships or
grants to students attending religious schools; three religious STOs received 85% of the
donations made that year. The principal beneficiary of the funds that otherwise would
have been paid to the state as tax revenues was the Catholic Diocese of Phoenix. The
program expanded significantly in 1999, its second year of operation; according to
plaintiffs, the Catholic Diocese of Phoenix alone received $ 4.5 million for its STO that
year, and the Catholic Diocese of Tucson reported more than $ 850,000 in donations as a
result of the tax scheme.
Id.
120. In the case of a married taxpayer filing a joint retum, the credit is increased to $1,000.
ARIZONA REV. STAT. ANN. §43-1089(A).

121.

Winn, 562 F. 3d at 1005.
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number of STO-provided scholarships became available to them.' 22
This inequality in the award of STO scholarships preferentially to
students attending religious schools-made possible by the state
approved design of the program-the plaintiffs contend causes the
23
program to violate the Establishment Clause of the U.S. Constitution. 1
3. Court's Ruling
The Ninth Circuit held that the plaintiff-taxpayers had Article III
standing under Flast to challenge the constitutionality of the exchange of
the Arizona tax credits for taxpayers' contributions to STOs because
plaintiffs have sufficiently alleged that the state used its taxing and
spending power to advance religion in violation of the Establishment
Clause of the First Amendment. 124 The United States Supreme Court,
however, reversed, holding that because taxpayers' suit "challenge[d] a
tax credit as opposed to a [direct] government expenditure, they lack[ed]
Article III standing under Flast v. Cohen."'125 In reaching its decision,
the Supreme Court enunciated that to come within the purview of Flast's
limited exception to the standing bar, taxpayers must satisfy a two-prong
test. 126

First, there must be a logical link between plaintiffs status and the
statute challenged. 127 To satisfy this prong, the Supreme Court explains,
taxpayer may allege that the federal government violated the
Establishment Clause of the First Amendment in the use of its legislative
power to collect and spend taxpayer money.' 28 To satisfy the second
prong, taxpayer must show a nexus between the plaintiff s status and the
allegation of constitutional violation challenged. 129 This prong, the
Court contends, is satisfied by taxpayer showing that government money
had been spent to fund religion in violation of the Establishment Clause
of the First Amendment.' 30 According to Flast, "[w]hen both nexuses
are established, the litigant will have shown a taxpayer's stake in the
outcome of the controversy and will be a proper and appropriate party to

122.

Id. at 1006.

123.

Id.

124.
challenge
125.
126.
127.

Id. at 1010-11.
("We therefore hold that plaintiffs have standing as taxpayers to
Section 1089 for allegedly violating the Establishment Clause.").
Arizona Christian Sch. Tuition Org. v. Winn, 131 S. Ct. 1436, 1437 (2011)
Id. at 1438.
Id. at 1445 (explaining the first prong of the Flast test).

128.

Id.

129.
130.

Id. (explaining the second prong of Flast test).
Id.
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' 13 1
invoke a federal court's jurisdiction."
Rather than applying the two-prong test as noted, 32 the Supreme
Court instead further explained that after stating the two prongs, Flast
evaluated them together and enunciated that taxpayers "suffer a
particular injury for standing purposes when, in violation of the
Establishment Clause and by means of the taxing and spending power,
their property is transferred through the Government's Treasury to a
sectarian entity."' 3 3 To come within this rule, the Supreme Court
continues, the taxpayer's allegation would be that "his money is being
extracted and spent in violation of specific constitutional protection
against such abuses by legislative power."' 34 The Supreme Court
posited that the "'Framers' generation worried that conscience would be
violated if citizens were required to pay taxes to support religious
institutions with whose beliefs they disagreed."' 135 After expressing
these rules, the Supreme Court concluded that because the government
was not directly spending taxpayers' money that had already been
extracted and placed in government treasury, but instead was issuing tax
credits to taxpayers in exchange for contributions they made to STOs
(which in turn used the contributions to support education in religious
schools), taxpayers do not have the requisite standing to pursue their

claims. 136

V. ANALYSES OF THE SUPREME COURT'S RULING
A.

Standing In General

Clearly, the taxpayers in Arizona had no standing, merely as
taxpayers, to contest the alleged government funding of religion in
violation of the Establishment Clause because, as a general matter, a
taxpayers' stake in the moneys of the treasury is relatively very small
and inestimable
and thus cannot serve as a basis to confer Article III
37
standing. 1

131. Flast,392 U.S. at 103.
132. Arizona, 131 S. Ct. at 1438.
133. Id. at 1445-46.
134. Id. at 1446.
135. Id. at 1447.
136. Id. at 1438.
137. Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 487 (1923) (establishing the rule against
taxpayer standing). See also Arizona, 131 S.Ct. 1436 (discussing the basis of standing).
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B.

The Flast Exception

However, under the Flast exception, taxpayer may obtain standing
if a two-prong nexus test is satisfied, namely: (1) whether there is a
logical link between the plaintiff's status and the statute challenged, and
(2) whether there is a nexus between the plaintiffs status and the
allegation of constitutional violation challenged. 38 Pursuant to Flast,
both nexus inquiries are satisfied when taxpayer alleges that a statute
enacted under the legislature's taxing and spending power violates the
Establishment Clause.1 39 Accordingly, Flast held that "[w]hen both
nexuses are established, the litigant will have shown a taxpayer's stake
in the outcome of the controversy and will be
a proper and appropriate
' 40
jurisdiction."'
court's
federal
a
invoke
to
party
In Arizona, the plaintiff-taxpayers appeared to have met both Flast
nexuses when they alleged that the Arizona State legislature enacted a
tax statute pursuant to its taxing and spending power under the state
constitution and that the tax statute violated the Establishment Clause by
granting tax credits to taxpayers in exchange for their contributions to
STOs, which in turn used the contributions to fund scholarships in
sectarian schools. 14 1 Rather than declare that the plaintiffs "have shown
a taxpayer's stake in the outcome of the controversy and will be a proper
and appropriate party to invoke a federal court's jurisdiction"'142 as
prescribed by Flast, the Supreme Court, instead, utilized a superficial
form-over-substance analysis to factually distinguish Flast by holding
that because the alleged religious funding challenged in Arizona was
effected indirectly through the use of tax credits as opposed to a direct
government appropriation and spending of taxpayer money in aid of
religion (as was the case in Flast), the indirect tax credit funding device
does not visit the injury identified in Flast to confer taxpayer with
Article III standing to sue.143
To buttress its distinction in support of its contention that
government money was not involved in the contributions to STOs to
138.
139.

See Flast, 392 U.S. at 102-03 (discussing the Flast exception).
See Id. at 102-03 ("The taxpayer-appellants in this case have satisfied both nexuses to

support their claim of standing under the test we announce today. Their constitutionalchallenge is

made to an exercise by Congress ofits power under Art. L § 8, to spend for the general welfare, and
the challenged program involves a substantial expenditure of federal tax funds. In addition,
appellants have alleged that the challenged expenditures violate the Establishment and Free
Exercise Clauses of the FirstAmendment.") (emphasis added).

140.

Id. at 103.

141.
142.
143.

See Plaintiffs' claim in Arizona, 131 S. Ct. at 1441.
See Flast,392 U.S. at 103.
See Arizona, 131 S. Ct. at 1438-39.
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finance scholarships in sectarian schools (to provide support for
standing), the Supreme Court declared that "[w]hen Arizona taxpayers
choose to contribute to STOs, they spend their own money, not money
the state has collected from respondents or from other taxpayers. 144 ...
Like contributions that lead to charitable tax deductions, contributions
yielding STO tax credits are not owed to the State
and, in fact, pass
45
directly from taxpayers to private organizations."'1
C. Do Arizonians Really "Spend Their Own Money" When They
Contribute To STOs And Receive State Tax Credits in Return For
the Contribution (to preclude taxpayer Standing Under Flast)?
The Supreme Court's pronouncement that "[w]hen Arizona
taxpayers choose to contribute to STOs, they spend their own money,
not money the state has collected from respondents or from other
taxpayers (and thus affords no basis for standing under Flast)"146 is
flawed, not entirely correct, and exemplifies the Court's misconception
of the distinction between tax credits and tax deductions.
First, the point of contention here is not that private taxpayers who
make normal contributions to STOs, in general, are not "spend[ing] their
own money" 147 when they make such contributions. Rather, the point of
contention is with the Supreme Court's refusal to recognize that when a
state issues a dollar-for-dollar tax credit to taxpayers in exchange for
their contributions to STOs which operate under a state mandate to
distribute at least ninety percent 148 of its contributions to finance
scholarships in private schools, and in the instant case, private sectarian
schools, the state ipsofacto subrogates itself as the de facto contributor,
thus making the contribution the spending of taxpayers' money in aid of
religion, in violation of the Establishment Clause.
Put differently, by issuing tax credits to taxpayers in exchange for
their private contributions to STOs, the state government is in essence
converting an otherwise private contribution into a state contribution or
state spending of taxpayers' money in aid of religion (because the only
144.

Id. at 1447.

See Professor Edward A. Zelinsky, Winn and the Inadvisability of

Constitutionalizing Tax Expenditure Analysis, 121 YALE L.J. ONLINE 25, 27 (2011) ("Winn thus

resurrects a question which has lain quiescent since Rosenberger: Does tax expenditure analysis
help to decide the constitutionality of tax and direct outlay programs?").
145.

Arizona, 131 S. Ct. at 1448.

146.
147.

Id. at 1447.
This is in reference to the Supreme Court's assertions that "[w]hen Arizona taxpayers

choose to contribute to STOs, they spend their own money, not money the state has collectedfrom
respondents orfrom other taxpayers." Id. at 1447 (emphasis added).

148.

The STOs are allowed to keep ten percent to offset operating expenses. Id. at 1440.
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taxpayer who can benefit from the tax credit is a contributor who already
owes taxes to the state). 149 This is so because tax credits, unlike tax
deductions, result in a dollar-for-dollar
reduction of the amount of tax a
50
taxpayer owes to the government. 1
Therefore, if the contributor-taxpayer did not owe the state of
Arizona any income taxes, he would not have used the tax credit in the
first place because the tax credit is applied only after the contributortaxpayer had already calculated the total amount of income tax liability
owed to the state government and then draw on the tax credit to pay
down the tax liability owed. Thus, taxpayer receiving the tax credit
would have no other use for it except to apply it to pay down the amount
of tax liability he already owed to the government. Hence, because the
state is giving back to the contributor that which he previously
paid/contributed to the STO, the state vicariously becomes the
contributor to the STO since it alone is out of money equal to the amount
of the contribution to the STO. 5 1
Furthermore, had the taxpayer not received the tax credit, he would
have had to remit his full tax liability (unreduced by the tax credit) to the
state's treasury in the form of state income tax payment.' 52 Likewise, it
is plausible that taxpayers would not have made any or some of the
contributions to the STOs in the first place had they not known or were
they not promised by the STOs that they would be reimbursed for all or
some of their contributions in the form of a state tax credit-thus,
making their contribution not really theirs but the state's. 153 In that
regard, isn't the government the ultimate contributor of the money to the
STO, which was eventually used to fund scholarships to students in
private sectarian schools?
That is why the Supreme Court's assertion that "[w]hen Arizona
taxpayers choose to contribute to STOs, they spend their own money,
not money the state has collected from respondents or from other
taxpayers"'' 54 is incorrect, flawed, and not logically sound. The only
reason why the STOs did not directly receive money that "the state [had
149. In which case, the contribution would violate the Establishment Clause of the First
Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. See U.S. CONST. amend. 1.
150. See discussion infra at V(D) example.
151. See illustration of this point in the Romeo and Juliet example infra at Part V(D).
152. This is so because a tax credit is a dollar-for-dollar reduction of the amount of tax
taxpayer owes.
153. "What does this cost me? Nothing. Your contribution is subtracted in full from total
state taxes owed for the year when you file your 2010 return." How You Can Help, THE ARIZONA
EPISCOPAL SCH. FOUND., http://www.az-esf.org/how.htm (last visited Mar. 10, 2013).
154.

Arizona Christian Sch. Tuition Org. v. Winn, 131 S. Ct. 1436, 1447 (2011).
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already] collected from respondents or from other taxpayers"'' 55 is
because the state affirmatively chose not to demand remittance of the
income tax liability already owed to it from the STO-contributing
taxpayers. Instead of demanding the tax, the state decided to forgive up
to $1,000 of the tax liability owed to it by crediting the same amount to
the STO-contributing taxpayers to offset up to $1,000 of the contribution
they made to the STOs (so as to circumvent the Establishment
Clause
15 6
proscription against government support of religion).
Consequently, the government has undeniably extracted 57 money
from taxpayers (by requiring state income tax payments to it) and has
spent 158 taxpayer money to fund education in sectarian schools in
violation of the Establishment Clause 5 9 (by issuing dollar-for-dollar tax
credits to taxpayers in exchange for contributions they made to the STOs
rather than demanding that the taxpayers remit up to $1,000 of state
taxes owed to it).160 Therefore, taxpayers in Arizona should have been
accorded standing under Flast. The following example illustrates how
the issuance of state tax credits is tantamount to government spending of
taxpayer money to finance education in sectarian schools in violation of
the Establishment Clause (so as to afford a basis for standing under
Flast).
D. Romeo and Juliet Example

161

Assume the following facts: Romeo and Juliet are married and are
citizens of the state of Arizona. Romeo and Juliet filed a joint state
income tax return in 2011 and had a state income tax liability of $3,000
before the application of state income tax credits. Romeo and Juliet
contributed $1,000 to an STO, which in turn awarded the $1,000
(without reduction for expenses) 62 in scholarships to fund math and
155. Id.
156. See ARIZONA REV. STAT. ANN. §43-1089 (West 2013) (allowing for provision of the tax
credits).
157. The first prong of Flast. See Arizona, 131 S. Ct. at 1445 (discussing the elements of
Flast).
158. Second criterion necessary to meet Flast. See Arizona, 131 S. Ct. at 1445 (discussing the
elements of Flast).
159. "The Establishment Clause of the First Amendment, applied to the States through the
Fourteenth Amendment, prevents a State from enacting laws that have the 'purpose' or 'effect' of
advancing or inhibiting religion." See Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 122 S. Ct, 2460, 2461 (citing
Agostini v. Felton, 117 S. Ct. 1997 (1997)).
160. Id.
161. This foregoing example is based purely on hypothetical facts.
162. A typical STO is permitted under ARIZONA REV. STAT. ANN. §43-1089 (West 2013) to
withhold up to ten percent of its contributions for administration of the program.
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reading skills at St. John's Catholic school (sectarian school) in Phoenix,
Arizona.
Without any state tax credits, Romeo and Juliet would have an out
of pocket expenditure in the total amount of $4,000 ($3,000 income tax
liability payable to the state of Arizona and $1,000 contribution to the
STO which in turn is used by the STO to fund education in the sectarian
schools). Given these facts, the state's treasury would increase by
$3,000 with the payment by Romeo and Juliet of the tax liability owed
to the state government. 163 If, however, the state grants Romeo and
Juliet a tax credit 64 of $1,000 against the $3,000 tax liability owed (so
as to reimburse them for the $1,000 they contributed to the STO), the
government's treasury would only increase by $2,000 ($3,000 minus the
$1,000 credit) with the resulting deficit of $1,000 going to pay for
taxpayer's contribution to the STO which in turn goes to fund education
in the sectarian school.
When the dust settles, Romeo and Juliet would have a total out-ofpocket expenditure of only $3,000 ($4,000 minus $1,000 of state tax
credit to reimburse them for their STO contribution) instead of the
$4,000 ($3,000 owed to the state and $1,000 contribution to the STO)
65
they would have incurred had there not been the state tax credit.'
Since only the government is out of the $1,000 that passed through the
STO to the sectarian school, only the government's money was in
essence "contributed" to the STO, which in turn ended up in the coffers
of the sectarian school (through the STO) in violation of the
Establishment Clause-contrary to the opinion of the Supreme Court
that "[w]hen Arizona taxpayers
choose to contribute to STOs, they
66
spend their own money."'
The Supreme Court's erroneous contention stems from its
conclusion that because the $1,000 of tax credit was not collected first
by the state, deposited into its treasury, before being given back out to
the STO, 161 the $1,000 is not government's money (even though it was
163.
In the event that Romeo and Juliet have not paid the $3,000 owed, the Treasury would
have a receivable due from Romeo and Juliet.
164. This credit would reduce the tax liability on a dollar-for-dollar basis.
165. This goes to show they didn't spend their money in the first place.
166. The fact that the contribution is actually bome by the state of Arizona and not the
taxpayer can be seen in the websites of some of the STOs advertisements. For instance, in the
Q&A section of the Arizona Episcopal School Foundation website, the following question and
answer is posted: "What does this [STO contribution] cost me? Nothing. Your contribution is
subtracted in full from total state taxes owed for the year when you file your 2010 return." How
You Can Help, THE ARIZONA EPISCOPAL SCH. FOUND., http://www.az-esf.org/how.htm (last visited
Mar. 10, 2013) (emphasis added).
167.
As was the case with Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968).
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owed to the government in income tax) and hence does not afford a basis
for standing under Flast. Such a superficial distinction is not logically
sound because it should be immaterial that the $1,000 of income tax
owed to the state that was forgiven in the form of tax credit was not
collected first by the state and then given back out to the STO because at
the end, when you collapse the two methods of financing,' 68 both are in
substance essentially the same and without a material difference.
Likewise, the Supreme Court's opinion that "[1]ike contributions
that lead to charitable tax deductions, contributions yielding STO tax
credits are not owed to the State and, in fact, pass directly from
taxpayers to private organizations"' 6 9 is misleading and not entirely
correct because tax credits are used by the STO contributor to pay down
income tax liability already owed to the state. Additionally, the
statement further exemplifies the Court's misunderstanding of the
difference between tax deductions and tax credits and why tax credits, as
used in the instant case, are akin to a government spending of taxpayer
money in aid of religion, 170 and hence, should have afforded a basis for
taxpayer standing under Flast.
As illustrated in the Romeo and Juliet example above,"'7 the $1,000
of tax credit issued to Romeo and Juliet was to offset the $1,000 of
income tax liability they owed to the state. Had they not received the
$1,000 of tax credit to reimburse them for the $1,000 of STO
contribution, they would have paid the $1,000 in income tax to the state.
Consequently, the $1,000 contribution was indeed money owed to the
government (contrary to the Supreme Court's assertion), 172 which ended
up in the coffers of the STO, in contravention of the Establishment
Clause.

168. That is, the tax credit step (used in Arizona) and the direct collecting of the tax first and
then spending the collected money later (which the Court seems to suggest would have afforded a
basis for standing).
169. Arizona Christian Sch. Tuition Org. v. Winn, 131 S. Ct. 1436, 1448 (2011).
170. And thus violates the Establishment Clause. "The Establishment Clause of the First
Amendment, applied to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment, prevents a State from
enacting laws that have the 'purpose' or 'effect' of advancing or inhibiting religion." See Zelman v.
Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. at 648-49 (citing Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 223-24 (1997)).
171. See supra Part V(D).
172. The Supreme asserted in Arizona that "contributions yielding STO tax credits are not
owed to the State." See Arizona, 131 S. Ct. at 1449.
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E.

Is IndirectAid of Religion Through The Grant of Tax Credits in
Exchangefor Contributionsto STOs MateriallyDifferent Than
Direct Extraction and Spending of Taxpayer Money in Aid of
Religion?
1. A Distinction Without a Difference

The Supreme Court's holding in Arizona was centered on its
distinction that "[b]ecause respondents challenge a tax credit as opposed
to a government expenditure, they lack Article III standing under Flast
v. Cohen."'173 Such distinction is without a material difference and not
sound or principled because the outcome of the inquiry for standing
purposes is premised entirely on the form in which the contribution was
made rather than the substance of the contribution taken as a whole. Put
differently, the Supreme Court's holding is saying that if the state had,
say, written a check of $1,000 from its treasury to the STOs which then
negotiated the draft to a sectarian school, taxpayers would have had
Article III standing to challenge the spending but because the state,
instead, issued tax credits (of up to $1,000 each) to taxpayers to
reimburse them for their contributions (of up to $1,000 each) to the
STOs, which in turn gave the $1,000 to sectarian schools, such use of tax
credit funding device would not confer Article III standing merely
because the money did not pass through the state treasury first before
being given to the sectarian school--despite the fact that, in substance,
the same amount of government's money ended up in the coffers of the
sectarian schools in both situations. 174
2. Elevation of Form-Over-Substance
Such a form-over-substance differentiation 175 based solely on the
means employed is puzzling because, ironically, it's the same Supreme
Court that developed the substance-over-form doctrine that the
government has routinely used to recast transactions that are mere
devices used to avoid taxation so as to reflect their true economic
173.

Id. at 1437. (holding that: "Because respondents challenged a tax credit as opposed to a

government expenditure, they lack Article IIl
standing under Flastv. Cohen.").
174.

Id. at 1457 (Kagan, J., dissenting) "Whenever taxpayers have standing under Flast to

challenge an appropriation, they should also have standing to contest a tax expenditure. Their
access to the federal courts should not depend on which type of financial subsidy the State has
offered." Id.
175. See id. at 1458 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (arguing that under the majority's view, "form
prevails over substance, and differences that make no difference determine access to the
judiciary.").
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realities. Under this doctrine, the Supreme Court enunciated in 1945
that:
The incidence of taxation depends upon the substance of a transaction.
The tax consequences which arise from gains from a sale of property
are not finally to be determined solely by the means employed to
transfer legal title. Rather, the transaction must be viewed as a whole,
and each step, from the commencement of negotiations to the
consummation of the sale, is relevant. A sale by one person cannot be
transformed for tax purposes into a sale by another by using the latter
as a conduit through which to pass title. To permit the true nature of a
transaction to be disguised by mere formalisms, which exist solely to
alter tax liabilities, would seriously
76 impair the effective administration
of the tax policies of Congress. 1
Undoubtedly, the reason why Arizona employed the tax credits
scheme (rather than a direct spending of taxpayer money) to generate the
contributions to STOs which then used the contributions to grant
scholarships to students in sectarian schools was to circumvent the
Establishment Clause prohibition against state support of religion. It is
apparent that the state knew it would run afoul of the Establishment
Clause if it directly paid taxpayers' money in treasury to the STOs which
then transmitted the money down to a sectarian school; that is
presumably why it employed the tax credit devise to mask the true
nature of the transaction, which seemingly was to find a way to use state
money to aid instruction in private religious schools.
In the words of the U.S. Supreme Court in Court Holding above,
"[tjo permit the true nature of a transaction to be disguised by mere
formalisms, which exist solely to alter [the Establishment Clause
prohibition] would seriously impair the effective administration of
the ...policies of Congress."' 177 Because the tax credit structure was
ostensibly a mere conduit for channeling funds to the sectarian schools
through the STOs, the substance of the transaction (which is government
funding of sectarian education with taxpayer money) should govern over
the form employed (which was the issuance of state tax credits in
exchange for taxpayer contributions to STOs).
Accordingly, the Supreme Court should have looked beyond the
form employed to the substance of the contributions taken as a whole
and should have found, as argued by the dissent discussed below, that
taxpayers in Arizona had Article III standing under the Flast exception
176.
177.

CIR v. Court Holding, 65 S. Ct. 707, 708 (1945) (emphasis added).
Id. at 708 (emphasis added).
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to the general rule against taxpayer standing to challenge the
constitutionality of the Arizona STO tax credits funding.
F.

The Dissent in Arizona By Justice Kagan

The dissent in Arizona, written by Justice Kagan and joined by
Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, and Sotomayor, correctly asserted that
plaintiff-taxpayers had standing under Flastto pursue their claims 78 and
properly disagreed with the majority's opinion that "because respondents
challenge[d] a tax credit as opposed to a government expenditure, they
lack Article III standing under Flast v. Cohen."'179 According to Justice
Kagan, "this distinction finds no support in case law, and just as little in
reason."'' 80 Furthermore, contrary to the majority opinion's finding that
taxpayers lacked the requisite injury element to support standing, the
dissent, stated that taxpayers could "satisfy not only Article III's injury
requirement, but also its causation and redressability requirements."'18
In this regard, the dissent argued that plaintiffs satisfied the injury
requirement when they alleged that the state transferred public funds, in
the form of tax credits, to the STOs.182 With respect to the causation
element of standing, the dissent posited that plaintiffs satisfied this
requirement by alleging that the state of Arizona caused them to suffer
injury by enacting a statute that allowed taxpayers to transfer funds
through the STOs to sectarian schools that were ultimately reimbursed
with state issued tax credits.' 83 Against this background, the dissent
argued that the plaintiffs' prayer for an injunction against the tax credit
issuance would redress the alleged harm by abating the continued
issuance of the tax credit by the state in exchange for the contributions
made through the STOs to sectarian schools. 84 Thus, contrary to the
majority's opinion, the dissent argued that the plaintiffs need not show
that the injunction remedy would impact their personal tax payments.185
Consequently, the dissent appropriately concluded that plaintiffs
should have been granted taxpayer standing to pursue their claims
because "when taxpayers object to the spending of tax money in

178.

Appeals'
179.
180.
181.
182.

Arizona,131 S. Ct. at 1452. (Kagan, J., dissenting) ("I would therefore affirm the Court of

determination... that Plaintiffs can pursue their claim in federal court.").
Id. at 1437.
Id. at 1452 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
Id. at 1460n.10.
Id.

183.

Id.

184.
185.

Id.
Id.
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violation of the Establishment Clause (whether through tax credits or
appropriations), an injunction against the spending would... redress
their injury, regardless of whether lawmakers would dispose of the
savings in a way that would benefit the taxpayer-plaintiffs
personally." 186 Likewise, the dissent is correct in its conclusion that
taxpayers met the Flast exception to be granted standing to pursue their
claims on the merits because, as previously stated, the majority's factual
differentiation of Flast based simply on the method of financing
1 87
employed "finds no support in case law, and just as little in reason."'
Notwithstanding the fact that the Supreme Court's holding in
Arizona led to the plaintiffs' voluntary withdrawal' 88 of the FFRF v.
Geithner California case-thus preventing the issues raised in the case
from being litigated on the merits-an unresolved question that continue
to persist is whether the parsonage exemption indeed violates the
Establishment Clause of the First Amendment to the U.S. constitution?
VI. DOES THE PARSONAGE EXEMPTION VIOLATE THE ESTABLISHMENT
CLAUSE?

A.

In General

In FFRFv. Geithner,' 89 taxpayers sought a declaration that sections
107 and 265(a)(6) of the Internal Revenue Code violate the
Establishment Clause by providing a parsonage exemption to the
minister of the gospel to the exclusion of other ministers. Following the
Supreme Court's ruling in Arizona that when "a government expends
resources or declines to impose a tax, its budget does not necessarily
suffer"' 190 to visit the requisite harm necessary to confer Article III
standing upon taxpayers, FFRF voluntarily filed a motion to dismiss its
suit on stipulations by both parties on June 17, 2011.191
Subsequent to the dismissal without prejudice, FFRF filed yet
another suit' 92 in Wisconsin on September 13, 2011, but this time,
seeking a judicial declaration that section 107 violates the Establishment

186.
187.

Id.
Id. at 1452.

188.

Order on Stipulation of Dismissal, FFRF v. Geithner, No. 2:09-CV-02894-WBS-DAD

(E.D. Cal. June 17, 2011).
189. FFRF v. Geithner, 715 F. Supp. 2d 1051 (E.D. Cal. 2010).
190. Arizona, 131 S. Ct. at 1437.
191. Order on Stipulation of Dismissal, supra note 188.
192. Freedom From Religion Found. Inc. v. Geithner, No. 11-CV-626, available at

http://ffrf.org/legal/challenges/ongoing-lawsuits/.
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Clause by providing preferential and discriminatory tax benefits in favor
of ministers of the gospel to the exclusion of other non-ministers of the
gospel, such as plaintiffs who are members of FFRF and received similar
housing allowances. 193
Following the government's answer and motion to dismiss 194 for
lack of subject matter jurisdiction because plaintiffs failed to allege in
their original complaint that the United States had waived its sovereign
immunity right to be sued, FFRF filed an amended complaint
("Amended Complaint") 195 on January 13, 2012, to cure the
jurisdictional defect in the original complaint by including in the
Amended Complaint a provision that the United States had waived
sovereign immunity under 5 U.S.C. §702. 196
B.

Summary Facts of the Amended Complaint

The plaintiffs in the Amended Complaint included three
individuals, namely, Anne Nicol Gaylor, Annie Laurie Gaylor, and Dan
Barker, all of whom are non-believers (atheists), federal taxpayers, and
life-time members of FFRF. 19 7 All three plaintiffs received housing
allowances provided by the FFRF and designated as such by the FFRF
Executive Council and FFRF governing body. 198
The housing
allowances paid to the FFRF plaintiffs did not exceed their housing
expenses. 199

However, because the plaintiffs are not ministers of the gospel as
defined under section 107,200 they are not entitled to exclude the housing
allowances from their gross income (as would ministers of the gospel).
Interestingly, FFRF plaintiff Dan Barker was previously an ordained
preaching minster of the gospel who had received the parsonage
exemption in the past and was able to exclude the payments at the time

193. Id.
194. US Government's Brief in Support of Its Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs' Complaint For
Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction, Freedom From Religion Found. Inc. v. Geithner, Civil Case
No. 11-CV- 626, available at http://ffrf.org/uploads/legal/Geithner-motion-to-dismiss.pdf.
195. See Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint, Freedom From Religion Found. Inc. v. Geithner, No.
11-CV-626, (W.D. Wise. Dec. 23, 2011), available at http://ffrf.org/uploads/legal/Geithner-

amendcomplaint.pdf.
196.
197.
198.
199.

See id.
Id.
Id.

Id.
200. To be a minister of the gospel within the meaning of the Code, the minister must be "duly
ordained, commissioned, or licensed [as a] minister of a church." Rev. Rul. 59-270, 1959-2 C.B.
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from gross income under section 107. 201 The plaintiffs allege that
section 107 violates the Establishment Clause and the equal protection
section of the Due Process Clause of the Constitution because it provides
an exclusive and discriminatory benefit to the minister of the gospel.20 2
C.

The EstablishmentClause and the Lemon v. Kurtzman Test

The Establishment Clause of the First Amendment to the U.S.
Constitution provides that "Congress shall make no law respecting of an
establishment of religion."20 3 In interpreting this proscription, the
United States Supreme Court developed a three-part test in Lemon v.
Kurtzman ("Lemon") 204 for determining whether a given federal or state
statute runs afoul of the proscription.
Under the Lemon enunciation: (1) "the statute must have a secular
legislative purpose"; (2) the "principal or primary effect" of the statute
"must be one that neither advances nor inhibits religion"; and (3) "the
statute must not foster an excessive government entanglement with
religion., 205 Against this background, we proceed to evaluate whether
the parsonage exemption violates the Establishment Clause of the First
Amendment to the U.S. Constitution 20 6 beginning with the first part of
the Lemon test.
D.

Does the ParsonageExemption Have a Secular Legislative
Purpose?

The answer to this inquiry requires an examination of the purpose
of the legislative act creating the parsonage exemption. The Parsonage
exemption was originally enacted as part of the Revenue Act of 1921 .207
Because the legislative history of the Revenue Act of 1921 (the "Act") is
tacit on the primary rationale for the parsonage exemption,20 8 we look to
the Committee Reports of the 1954 modification of the governing Code
provision to glean the legislative purpose of the Act. In his remark to
Congress explaining the reasons why he sponsored the addition of I.R.C.
201. See Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint, supra note 195.
202. Id.
203. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
204. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
205. Id.at 612-13.
206. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
207. Pub. L. No. 67-98, 42 Stat. 239, 67th Congress, Sess. 1.ch. 136 (1921).
208. See e.g., Driscoll v. Comm'r, 135 T.C. 557, 561 (2010). ("As respondent concedes, the
rationale for the exclusion from gross income in section 213(b)(11) of the Revenue Act of 1921 of
the so-called parsonage allowance is 'obscure."').
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§ 107(2) to the existing statute, Congressman Peter F. Mack Jr. stated the
following on June 9, 1953 that:
On March 26 of this year, I introduced H.R. 4275 to permit clergymen
to exclude from gross income that amount paid to them by a church
specifically in lieu of furnishing them a dwelling house. Under our
present tax laws, section 22(B), persons who are furnished a dwelling
house in connection with their occupation must include within gross
income for tax purposes the rental value of such dwelling. Subsection
(6) exempts clergymen therefrom. In most cases such dwelling house
is the parsonage, manse or parish house. Yet where the church does
not furnish its clergy a dwelling house because it does not own one or
because of other circumstances, the sum of the money paid by the
church to the clergymen specifically in lieu of furnishing him a
dwelling must be included in gross income and taxed in the usual
graduated manner. If enacted, my proposal would remove this
inequity and permit all clergymen to exclude from gross income that
part of a specific rental allowance up to the rental value of the rental
house actually occupied.
Mr. Chairman, I hope that your committee will favorably report this
bill at a very early date. Certainly, in these times when we are being
threatened by a godless and antireligion world movement we should
correct this discriminationagainst certain ministers of the gospel who
are carrying on such a courageousfight against this foe. Certainly
this is not too much
to do for these people who are caring for our
209
spiritual welfare.
In response to Congressman Peter Mack's statements and
advocacy, Congress passed I.R.C. §107(2) which expanded the
parsonage exemption to exclude from gross income the rental allowance
paid to a minister of gospel as part of his compensation, to the extent
used by him to rent or provide a home.21 °
As can be seen from Congressman Peter Mack's comments calling
for an expedited passage of the parsonage exemption because, "in these
times when we are being threatened by a godless and antireligion world
movement we should correct this discrimination against certain ministers
of the gospel who are carrying on such a courageous fight against this

209.

Hearings Before the H. Comm. on Ways & Means, 83rd Cong. I (June 9, 1953)

(Statement Of Hon. Peter F. Mack, Jr, On H.R. 4275, Concerning The Taxability Of A Cash
Allowance Paid To Clergymen In Lieu Of Furnishing Them A Dwelling On Forty Topics Pertaining
to the General Revision of the Internal Revenue Code, pg. 1574-1575) (emphasis added).
210. I.R.C. §107(2) (West 2013).
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foe, ' '2 11 it is clear that the legislative purpose of I.R.C. § 107(2)212 of the

parsonage exemption was principally to advance religion with no
discernible secular purpose whatsoever.213 That is seemingly why the
parsonage exemption was narrowly tailored to specifically benefit only
ministers of the gospel to the exclusion of other ministers.
To assure this outcome, the Department of Treasury stipulated
2 14
bright line rules for qualification as a minister of the gospel.
Consequently, the parsonage exemption lacks a secular purpose to
comport with the Establishment Clause's proscription against Congress
making laws respecting of religion. Even though a federal or state
statute that violates any part of the three-part Lemon test is
unconstitutional, 1 5 the foregoing evaluation would proceed to examine
whether the principal or primary effect of the statute advances or inhibits
religion.
E.

Does the ParsonageExemption's "principalorprimary effect"
advance or inhibit religion?

Under the second prong of the Lemon test, the principal or primary
effect of the statute "must be one that neither advances nor inhibits
religion., 216 On its face, the parsonage exemption appears to have a
principal or primary effect of advancing religion because the exemption
expressly provides that "[i]n the case of a minister of the gospel, gross
income does not include-(1) the rental value of a home furnished to
him as part of his compensation; or (2) the rental allowance paid to him
as part of his compensation, to the extent used by him to rent or provide

211.
See U.S. CONST. amend. I.
212.
I.R.C. § 107(2).
213.
Hearings Before the H. Comm. on Ways & Means, 83rd Cong. 1 (June 9, 1953)
(Statement Of Hon. Peter F. Mack, Jr, On H.R. 4275, Concerning The Taxability Of A Cash
Allowance Paid To Clergymen In Lieu Of Furnishing Them A Dwelling On Forty Topics Pertaining
to the General Revision of the Internal Revenue Code, pg. 1574-1575) ("Certainly, in these times
when we are being threatened by a godless and antireligion world movement we should correct this
discrimination against certain ministers of the gospel who are carrying on such a courageous fight
against this foe. Certainly this is not too much to do for these people who are caring for our
spiritual welfare.").
214.
Treas. Reg. §§1.107-1(a); 1.107-1(b); Rev. Rul. 59-270, 1959-2, C.B. 44 (clarifying the
qualifications and duties of a minister of the gospel).
215. See Vernon v. City of LA, 27 F. 3d 1385, 1396-97 (9th Cir. 1994) ("The Supreme Court
has held that the challenged practice must survive all three prongs of the Lemon analysis in order to
be held constitutional."); Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 583 (1987) ("State action violates the
EstablishmentClause if it fails to satisfy any of these prongs.").
216.
Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612 (1971).
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a home. 2 17
This contention is buttresses by the fact that under the prevailing
tax regime, no other taxpayer is allowed to exclude employer-provided
housing, lodging, or allowance, from gross income except in cases
where the taxpayer-employee is required to accept such housing or
lodging as a condition of his employment and the housing or lodging is
provided on the business premises of the employer.218
Thus, unlike the housing exemption under I.R.C. §1 19(a)(2), 2t 9 the
parsonage exemption does not require, as a condition for the receiving
the exemption, that the clergy accept the housing or allowance as a
condition of employment and that the housing or rental (in cases where
an allowance was furnished) be provided on the business premises of the
employer. 220 Instead, the parsonage exemption is a rather unconstrained
tax benefit designed exclusively to seemingly advance religion by
providing the housing subsidy to the minister of the gospel without any
precondition other than just being a minister of the gospel. 22'
According to Congressman Jim Ramstad, R. Minn., "[c]lergy
members of every faith and denomination rely on the housing allowance.
Without it, America's clergy face a devastating tax increase of $2.3
billion over the next 5 years. 222 These statements buttress the fact that
the parsonage exemption has the principal
effect of advancing religion in
223
violation of the second Lemon test.
Likewise, the contention that the parsonage exemption has a
principal or primary effect of advancing religion can be gleaned from the
comments made by the religious establishment (that lobbied Congress)
in opposition to the proposal to eliminate the parsonage exemption. For
example, ChristianityTodayMagazine reports that:
The allowances are a big help to pastors. (Matt Branaugh quoting
Richard Hammar in his annual Church & Clergy Tax Guide They
'represent the most significant tax benefit enjoyed by ministers.')
They're a big help to churches, especially small ones, as they try to
recruit and retain gifted pastors, often on tight budgets. Church leaders
also claim allowances help communities, keeping churches active and
217. I.R.C. §107 (West 2013) (emphasis added).
218. Id. at I.R.C. § 119(a)(2).
219. Id.
220. The only qualification for the exclusion is that taxpayer is a "minister of the gospel" as
defined under I.R.C §107.
221. I.R.C. §107.
222. Clergy Housing Allowance Clarification Act of 2002, 148 Cong. Rec. H1299-01 (Apr.
16, 2002).
223. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612 (1971).
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healthy in local neighborhoods.
When CHACA was under
consideration, one congressman warned the loss of the benefit might
chase away many clergy who suddenly faced added housing costs on
already modest salaries. With the economy still inching to recovery
after a multiyear recession and many congregations struggling to offer
pay raises,
the housing allowance is a benefit churches don't want to
224
lose.

Accordingly, by expressly excluding the parsonage allowance from
the gross income of only the minister of the gospel,225 the statute has the
principal effect of advancing religion.
Ironically, the Federal
government seemed to have recognized this fact in 1984 when the then
Secretary of Treasury, Donald T. Regan, proposed the repeal of the
parsonage exemption to President Ronald Reagan. In the proposal for
change, the Secretary stated:
The exclusion from income of the parsonage allowance departs from
generally applicable income measurement principles, with the result
that ministers pay less tax than other taxpayers with the same income
or even smaller economic incomes. Thus, a minister with a salary of
$18,000 and a $6,000 cash housing allowance is in the same economic
position and has the same ability to pay tax as a taxpayer (such as a
teacher) earning $24,000 in taxable income and spending $6,000 on
housing. The tax liability of the minister is considerably less,
however, due to the current exclusion from taxable income of the
parsonage allowance. Further, as with other deviations from income
measurement principles, the exclusion of the parsonage allowance
narrows the tax base and places upward pressure on marginal tax rates.
There is no evidence that the financial circumstances of ministers
justify special tax treatment. The average minister's compensation is
low compared to other professions, but not compared to taxpayers in
general. Moreover, the tax benefit of the exclusion provides a
disproportionately greater benefit to relatively affluent ministers,
due
226
to the higher marginal tax rates applicable to their incomes.
Additionally, the statements by Congressman Peter Mack, the
sponsor of the I.R.C. § 107(2), to the House Ways and Means Committee
advocating the enactment of the provision further supports the
contention that the principal or primary effect of the enactment of

224.

See

Housing

Disallowance?,

CHRISTIANITY

TODAY,

http://www.christianitytoday.com/le/2011/spring/housing.html (last visited Mar. 10, 2013).
225.
See I.R.C. §107.
226. DEP'T OF THE TREASURER, TAX REFORM FOR FAIRNESS, SIMPLICITY, AND ECONOMIC
GROWTH (Nov. 27, 1984).
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parsonage exemption was to advance religion of the minister of the
gospel. In his remarks, Congressman Peter Mack stated:
Of our clergymen 55 percent are receiving less than $2,500 per year.
This is some $256 (sic) less than the $2,668 annual median income for
our labor force. It is well to keep in mind that many of these
clergymen support families like the rest of us, and that many of these
clergymen still receive low income based on227the 1940 cost of living
but must pay 1953 rents for a dwelling house.
Consequently, the parsonage exemption has a principal or primary
effect of advancing religion.
G. Does the Statute Fosteran Excessive Government Entanglement
With Religion?
Finally, the last prong of the Lemon test requires that "the statute
must not foster an excessive government entanglement with religion. 22 8
As the foregoing analysis reveals, the parsonage exemption fosters an
excessive government entanglement with religion because the statute is
narrowly tailored to benefit only the "minister of the gospel" as defined
229
by the government.
In Rev. Rul. 59-270,23o the Treasury Department defined a minister
of the gospel within the meaning of I.R.C. §107, as an individual who2 is
"a duly ordained, commissioned, or licensed minster of a church. 31
Such narrow definition encumbers the government with the burden of
determining who is a minister of the gospel and who is not and
consequently fosters an excessive government entanglement with
religion.
To further illustrate the extent that the statute fosters excessive
government entanglement with religion, the Treasury Department noted
in Revenue Ruling 59-270232 that neither a "minister of music" nor a

"minister of education" is a minister of the gospel within the meaning of
I.R.C. §107 because neither of them was "an ordained minister of the
227. Hearings Before the H. Comm. on Ways & Means, 83rd Cong. 1 (June 9, 1953)
(Statement Of Hon. Peter F. Mack, Jr, On H.R. 4275, Concerning The Taxability Of A Cash
Allowance Paid To Clergymen In Lieu Of Furnishing Them A Dwelling On Forty Topics Pertaining
to the General Revision of the Internal Revenue Code, pg. 1575).
228. See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 613 (1971).
229. Rev. Rul. 59-270, 1959-2 C.B. 44. See also Treas. Reg. §1.107-1(a) (1963) (clarifying
the duties of a minister of the gospel).
230. Rev. Rul. 59-270, 1959-2 C.B. 44.
231. Id.
232. Id.
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gospel" despite the fact that both performed services and functions
typical of the office of a minister of the gospel.233 Such intrusive
evaluation of the functions of various clergies to ascertain whether or not
they are ministers of the gospel does nothing more than excessively
tangle the government in the web of religion in violation of the
Establishment Clause. Accordingly, the parsonage exemption violates
the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment of the Constitution.
VII. CONCLUSION
As the foregoing article demonstrates, the parsonage exemption
runs afoul of the Establishment Clause restraint on government support
of religion by providing a subsisting exclusive tax subsidy to the
minister of the gospel (to the exclusion of other ministers) with no
discernible secular purpose. Likewise, the state of Arizona's use of tax
credits device to systematically finance scholarships through STOs to
students attending sectarian schools is materially indistinguishable from
the state expending treasury funds in support of the education of students
attending private sectarian schools.
Although, in general, taxpayers do not have standing, merely as
taxpayers, to challenge these alleged affront on the Establishment
Clause, taxpayers in both of these instances should have been granted
Article III standing to have the merits of their allegations reviewed under
the principles of Flast except that the U.S. Supreme Court appears now
resolved to stand in the way of taxpayer standing by enunciating, based
on a superficial distinction, that because "respondents challenge a tax
credit as opposed to a government expenditure, they lack Article III
standing under Flast v. Cohen12 3 4 to bring suit, and that when "a
government expends resources or declines to impose a tax, its budget
does not necessarily suffer" to confer Article III standing upon
taxpayer.235 Such a flimsy differentiation between a tax credits funding
device and a direct expenditure method (which formed the nucleus of the
ruling) is flawed, unsound, without a material difference, not principled,
or even entirely correct, because the dispositive inquiry for standing
purposes is premised entirely on the form in which the contribution was
made rather than the substance of the contribution taken as a whole.

233.
234.
235.

Id.
Arizona Christian Sch. Tuition Org. v. Winn, 131 S. Ct. 1437 (2011).
Id.
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